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EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND: A CONTENTION-ORIENTED APPROACH'

Gregory M. Malley. Michael A. McCarthy. alld Grace 8. Yukich'

In

canlrasl /0

prevalent theories of terrorism, this study develops a contenlion-oriented

approach where levels and/orms a/puli/ical violence againsl civilians depend upon: (I) the
sirolegies 0/ combatoms; (1) the means of contention; (3) Ihe localions of alUes and
opponenlS; (4) Ihe colleclive identities of combOfoms : and (5) the dynamics of contention,
incltlding whether or nol represenlUlives ofparamilitary organi=ations are included ;n formal
peace processes. Quantilalive analyses of a muJti-Jourcc database of civilian deaths taking
place ;n Northern Ireland between 1966 and 2006 offer preliminary support for this approach.
The study underscores Ihe insights provided by theories and melhodf used in Ihe fields of
social movemenls research and peace and conflici slUdies.

The concept of terrorism is deeply emotive, power-laden, and contested. Thus, the frequent use
of the term ''terror'' in public discourse provides an opportunity for academic research to
resonate with the pUblic. Yet, use of the tenn in research runs the danger of scholarly work
legitimating the agendas of the powerful while overlooking oppression as an underlying source
of insurgency. It also runs the risks of glossing over variations in the actors responsible for
political violence against civilians as well as differences in the motivations of those responsible.
These dangers and risks are evidenced by the ad-hoc analyses found in the 9/11 literature. Much
of this work is based on theories that have been discredited in the fields of social movement
research and peace and conflict studies.
In contrast, this article calls for a contention-oriented approach to understanding political
violence against civilians. We conceptualize four distinct types of political violence against
civilians-selective, collective, categorical, and indiscriminate. Moreover, we argue that five
facets of contention help to explain variations in the levels and fonns of political violence
against civilians: (I) the strategies of combatants; (2) the means of contention; (3) the locations
of allies and opponents; (4) the collective identities of combatants; and (5) the dynamics of
contention, including dynamics related to peace processes. Quantitative analyses of lethal
political violence against civilians in Northern Ireland between 1966 and 2006 are used to
illustrate the utility of the four-part typology. as well as to assess hypotheses regarding factors
influencing each type of political violence against civilians. The analyses largely support our
hypotheses, underscoring the promise of a contention-oriented approach.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES BEYOND "TERROR"

Scholars have developed a myriad of definitions of terror that variously emphasize the perpetrator of violence, the target of violence, and the intent of violence. We argue that because
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of a lack of definitional consensus, the pejorative character of the term, and challenges in its

operationalization, researchers should use the lenn political violence instead of terrorism.
Several scholars limit perpetrators of terror to nonstate actors (see, for example, Sommier
2002; Bergesen and Li zardo 2004; Black 2004; LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Others, however, point out that states also commit acts of terror against civilians (Herman and O'Sullivan
1989; Gareau 2004; Goodwin 2006; Drake 2007; Froystad 2009). Defining political violence

against civilians by noostate actors as terrorism and political violence against civilians by
slate actors as something other than terrorism serves to delegitimate the actions of insurgents
while legitimating the actions of state actors (San Juan, Jr. 2005; Butko 2006). It reinforces
the taken-for-granted assumption that states rightfully have a monopoly over organized
violence and use that monopoly for the good of their citizens. By using the term " terrorism" to

only refer to the actions of noostate actors, scholars are contributing to a dominant discourse
that symbolically and strategically gives advantages to powerful actors (Woehrle, Coy, and
Maney 2008). Subtly reinforcing the legitimacy of the state could be problematic when the
state engages in human rights abuses against ci vilians who, in tum, rebel against the state.
Such distinctions also lead us in lhe wrong direction in understanding political violence
against civilians. Some states commit extensive po litical vi olence against civilians to inspire
fear and terror (Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer n.d.; Cohen and Corrado 2005; Gill 2007; Maher and
Peterson 2008 ; Seri 2008; Froystad 2009). Using different labels to describe political violence
against civilians by state actors versus nonstate actors precludes the exploration of possible
similarities in the causes of the same behavior (Goodwin 2007).'
A greater degree of agreement exists regarding victims of terrorism, with most scholars
limiting victims to civilians (see, for instance, Sommier 2002; Carr 2003 ; Bergesen and
Lizardo 2004; Black 2004; Butko 2006; Goodwin 2006; Drake 2007; LaFree and Ackerman
2009). Yet the term civilian often remains undefined. As will be discussed in detail below,
many actors outside the state are actively engaged in political contention, some of which is

violent, either in opposition to or in defense of the state. Moreover. extreme acts of violence
against combatants can also be intended to inspire fear.
This brings us to the use of intent in defining terrorism. Some scholars have defined terror

as acts that either are intended to cause or actually do cause feelings of terror in one or more
audiences (Walzer 2004; LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Jeff Goodwin (2006), however, points

out that several definitions of terrorism do not refer to the intent or effect of inspiring terror or
fear (Tilly 2004; Crenshaw 1981 ; Black 2004; Bergesen and Li zardo 2004). Assuming that
political violence against civilians is always motivated by a desire to instill fear is
questionable. Civilians may be terrorized by an act of political violence without this being the
intent of the perpetrator. Given the necessity of sublimating these feelings to both create and
cope with contexts of high levels of political violence, establishing what people actually feel
about acts of political violence is difficult methodo logically, not to mention problematic
ethically in terms of the rights of human subjects.
Given these multiple limitations, we argue that sociologists should use the concept of
political violence instead of terrorism. When compared to the concept of terrorism, the

concept of political violence sensitizes analysts to variations in perpetrators, victims, intent.
and consequences. At the same time, the tenn political emphasizes that the organized violence
is committed in the pursuit of challenging or defending extant authoriiy (Snow, Soule, and
Kriesi 2004). As such, it avoids the tendency of pejorative terms like terrorism to portray
those engaged in organized violence as unthinking and unreasoned and, therefore, incapable
of being persuaded through education or negotiation.

The Ghosts a/Theories Past: Explaining Political Violence against Civilians

While moving away from the concept of terrorism, it is nonetheless important to
understand political vio lence against nonstate actors. Nonstate actors are more likely to be
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casualties of modem and postmodem warfare than are state actors (Azam 2006). Moreover,
many "civilians" play important roles in political violence, either directly through participation
in combat or indirectly through material and moral support for combatants (Gross 2009).
Given the prominence of Charles Tilly's work in the field, there has been a rather puzzling neglect of political violence by social movement researchers. Perhaps because of this
neglect, much of the recent research on political violence against civilians by scholars in the
fields of terrorism studies, security studies, and criminology draw from theories that have
largely been discredited within the field of collective behavior and social movements. Some
scholars have drawn on functionalism and early collective behavior theories to explain
terrorism. Agnew (20 I 0), for instance, has advanced a strain-based explanation. Gottschalk
and Gottschalk (2004) attribute terrorism by nonstate actors in the Middle East to their
authoritarian tendencies and pathological hatred. The authors explicitly reject rational motives
for their actions. Explanations rooted in deprivation theory have also featured prominently
(Senechal de la Roche 1996; Stem 2003; Black 2004).
Just as these theories were applied to innovative social movements threatening the power

status quo in the 1950s and 1960s, they are now being applied to similarly innovative movements. That studies of "terrorism" in the immediate aftermath of 911 1 have largely stigmatized insurgents and ignored political repression and structural violence as sources of

armed conflict is hardly surprising. What is surprising is that social movement scholars have
yet to apply contemporary theories and rigorous methods of research to challenge these
studies. More recent social movement scholarship has much to offer in increasing our under-

standing of political violence against civilians. In this article we put forth a contentionoriented approach that emphasizes the goals, identities, strategies, and interactions among
those involved, either directly or indirectly, in content jon.
A Contention-Oriented Approach

We propose four categories of political violence that separate civilian victims based upon
the nature and extent of their proximity to contention- selective, collateral, categorical. and
indiscriminate. Goodwin (2006) distinguishes between selective and categorical political
violence against civilians. Selective political violence against civilians involves political
violence against specific nonstate actors targeted because of their perceived or actual behaviors. "Civilians" frequently participate directly in violent contention as members of police
or military auxiliaries and reserves, militias, vigilante groups, and paramilitary organizations

(Romero 2000; Branch 2005 ; Gross 2009). Some civilians become directly involved in less
formal ways, such as participating in fights and riots that are politically related. Other
civilians, while not directly participating in political violence, are seen as supporting it.
Civilians also play a variety of other roles in political contention, including those of non-

violent activists, office holders, members of political parties, groups, or associations, infonnants, collaborators. provocateurs, fund raisers and financial supporters, service providers,
outspoken lawyers. investigative journalists, and propagandists-to name a few . As such, it is
often erroneous to assume that all civilians are "innocent" in the sense that they have not

played a role in contention.
As political violence escalates, civilians are routinely pressured into becoming involved

in contention. A failure to either support or to oppose participants can result in a civilian being
targeted for violence. For example, civilians can be targeted simply for fraternizing with opposing combatants or complicit civilians. The act of "crossing over" is viewed as a betrayala violation of group commitment worthy of violent expiation (Maney 2005 ; Maney, Ibrahim,
Higgins, and Herzog 2006). At other times, simply refusing to provide support requested by
combatants can be grounds for being altacked. Lronically, the refusal to become involved in
contention becomes a source of selective political violence. Moreover, persons who witness
unlawful contentious acts and, therefore, threaten to bring about the incarceration or execution
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of combatants are likely to be targeted. In these ways, violent political contention colonizes
the civilian population, decreasing the number of non-engaged persons.
Selective political violence includes not only targeting civilians because of their political
roles, but also targeting civilians because of other roles and bebaviors such as common
criminal behaviors or personally offending one or more individuals participating in armed
contention. Increased antisocial behaviors are a frequent by-product of the reduced ability of
the state to enforce laws in insurgent strongholds. At the same time, paramilitary organizations and civil defense committees develop capacities to enforce ru les through organized
violence. Doing so often enhances the legitimacy of these actors in areas they relied on for
providing members and support. In assuming the roles and functions of authorities, these
actors in effect develop provisional governments. This is particularly important in signaling
tangible progress toward revolutionary goals. In other instances, apolitical deviance is negatively sanctioned for political reasons. For instance, some paramilitary organizations fund
their operations through drug dealing and/or bank robberies. Killing apolitical drug dealers
and bank robbers effectively eliminates competition for resources used to fund paramilitary
operations.
In addition to selectively targeting perceived criminals, individual combatants sometimes
take advantage of their access to weaponry and relative protection from reprisal to act on
grudges against acquaintances. For instance, studies of the Rwandan genocide reveal that many
of the victims were murdered by those with wbom they previously had disputes (Brubaker
and Laitin 1998). Having theorized reasons why civilians are killed because of their perceived
or actual behaviors, we now tum to explaining why civilians are targeted for no reason other
than their social group affiliation.
In contrast to selective political violence, categorical political violence against civilians

is political violence targeting nons tate actors because of their perceived or actual affiliation
with a specific collectivity, regardless of whether or not they are involved in contention
(Goodwin 2006). Collective bases for categorical political violence frequently include, but
certainly are not limited to, ethnicity, religion, race, nationality, and social class. The colon·

izing logic of political contention also helps us to understand the tendency to view most, if not
all, members of a collectivity as being complicit in contention. Moreover, creating strong

discursi ve, relational, and physical boundaries with an opposing group facilitates the development of a strong movement identity and, in tum, high levels of active participation in the
struggle (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Maney et a!. 2006; White 20 10). Ethnonationalist identities are particularly likely to be characterized by strong boundaries. All people are seen to be
members of a nation by virtue of their shared cultural characteristics and/or demonstrations of
national loyalty. Each member of the nation has rights that those who are not part of the
nation do not have. These rights come with responsibilities to the nation ; above all, the
responsibility to take up arms in its defense. From the perspective of those holding such
assumptions, it is impossible to conceive of a member of a nation who is not complicit in anned

ethnonationalist struggle.
We propose two additional, distinct types of political violence against civilians: collateral
political violence and indiscriminate political violence. Collateral political violence against
civilians involves political violence against nons tate actors that results inadvertently from
operations targeting other individuals believed to have played past or present roles in political
contention. Those civilians who experience this type of violence are not the intended targets.'
There is still another type of political violence against civilians that has yet to be categorized: political violence against civi1ians who have no behavioral, physical, relational, or
communal connection to contention. In other words, civilians who are targeted (as opposed to

being collateral damage) are not perceived as playing either direct or indirect individual roles
in contention and do not belong to a specific collectivity involved in the conflict. We refer to
this phenomenon as indiscriminate political violence against civilians. Those without involvement or perceived complicity in political contention are the targets.)
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We argue that behavioral, physical, and relational proximity of civilians to contention
increases the likelihood that they will be the victims of political violence. Accordingly, we
expect that indiscriminate political violence against civilians takes place the least among the
four types (H I; see Appendix A for a list of all hypotheses). From a contention-oriented perspective, blind violence against civilians should be a relatively rare occurrence. A contentionoriented perspective also suggests that portrayals of civilian killings as mostly being
categorical political violence motivated solely by sectarian hatreds ignore the likely prevalence of political violence based upon the behaviors of targeted civilians, as well as their
physical proximity to contention. By virtue of their perceived influence on the outcome of
contention, civilians participating in political contention are most likely to be targeted for
violence by those seeking to eliminate their participation and (by example) similar participation by other civilians. To a lesser extent and as a byproduct of contention, we expect to see
civilians targeted either because of their perceived common criminal behaviors or to carry out
personal vendettas. In addition, civilians in close proximity to selective political violence are
frequently caught in the crossfire, metaphorically and often literally. Participants in contention
are often heavily guarded. It is also not uncommon for participants to surround themselves
with civilians who serve as "human shields." After detening or eliminating civilian opponents, we assume that strategic-minded actors have the greatest interest in deterring or
eliminating those providing material and moral support to these opponents. Accordingly, we
expect that over the course of a cycle of contention that selective and collateral political violence will constitute large percentages of civilian victims (H2).
Having differentiated between four different types of political violence against civilians,
we now theorize the causes of these phenomena. As part of a contention-oriented approach
emphasizing the agency of participants (Jasper 2004), we argue that the levels and types of
political violence against civilians depend in no small part upon the strategies of combatants.

Strategies of Combatants

Levels and types of political.violence against civilians are likely to reflect plans of action
for achieving the goals of the combatants within a given context. For example, both categorical and indiscriminate political violence can reflect a deliberate strategy of destabilization on
the part of insurgents. In a colonial context, the financial costs to the state may provide
sufficient incentive to territorially withdraw or separate. In the context of class-based conflict,
the elimination of capital could be viewed as paving the way toward alternative forms of
economic production. For insurgents not concerned with popular legitimacy, indiscriminate
political violence can represent an attempt to eliminate mobilization on behalf of the state by
civilians regardless of their social group affiliations. Accordingly, we hypothesize that major
changes in the strategies of combatants are likely to lead to significant changes in the levels
and types of political violence perpetrated against civilians (H3). The strategies of armed
contention selected, in turn, depend upon factors familiar to social movement scholars, including the means of contention, assessments of allies and opponents, the collective identities
of participants, and interactions among contenders (Maney, Kutz-Flamenbaum, Rohlinger,
and Goodwin 20 I 2).
Means of Contention

The means of contention influence the likelihood of political violence against civilians.
Benini and Moulton (2004) find that civilians in Afghanistan were killed as the indirect
effects of munitions used by allied forces as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Home
(2002) and Sommier (2002) both argue that new military resources and technologies increase
the capacity for destruction and, therefore, the likelihood of indiscriminate violence.
Some technologies for killing are less discriminating than others. In particular, explosives
and plane crashes are more likely to result in higher numbers of civilian casualties compared
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to fists, rocks, knives, or bullets. As a result, relative access to different types of weaponry
will greatly influence levels of political violence against civilians. In this regard, we expect
that the increased availability of less discriminating weaponry increases all forms of political
violence against civilians (H4). The availability of weaponry and other resources depends
upon the presence and degree of support from those not directly participating in contention.

Allies and Opponents
Goodwin (2007: 2027) defmes complicit civilians as noncombatants who benefit from,
support, or have substantial capacity to influence opposing actors. He hypothesizes that
categorical political violence against civilians is most likely to occur when opposing actors
think that it is unlikely that they can draw support from complicit civilians. These actors are
thought to be more likely to hold these perceptions in three contexts: (I) complicit civilians
support extensive political violence; (2) complicit civilians are numerous and relatively unprotected; and (3) political alliances or cooperation between the political actor and the
civilians in question are weak or absent due to strong linguistic, religious, and/or territorial
segregation (Goodwin 2007: 2039-40). This leads us to expect that civilians in areas providing high levels of support for an armed actor are more likely to be victims of categorical
political violence (H5).

Collective Identities 0/ Combatants
Levels of categorical violence against civilians can also be influenced by the collective
identities of participants (Bhatt 20 I 0). The perception of the potential of complicit civilians to
be potential supporters of combatants is not only a product of social distance and history, but
also very much a product of collective identity. The collective identities of some political
actors may prevent them from engaging in high levels of political violence against complicit
civilians, even when each of these three contextual factors discussed in the preceding subsection are present. State actors may seek to demobilize, if not convert, complicit civilians by
arguing that they are citizens guaranteed equal rights and equal protection by the state. To
engage in categorical political violence against these civilians would violate a rule of behavior
and group commitment that could be central to the collective identity and/or discursive
strategy of state building. Moreover, it would likely not only further de-legitimate the state
but also intensify levels of both participation in and support for insurgents.
Nonstate political actors may eschew categorical political violence for similar reasons.
They may construct their collective identities as being inclusive of all nonstate actors even
when civilians draw strong identity bnundaries between themselves and the insurgents. To
engage in categorical terrorism would violate a fundamental rule of behavior and group
commitment (that is, it would be transgressive from the perspective of the insurgents).
Accordingly, we expect that combatants with more incl usive collective identities will be less
likely to engage in categorical political violence than combatants with more exclusive
collective identities (H6). Nonetheless, strong identity commitments may not be sufficient to
constrain political violence against civilians in response to provocation.

Dynamics o/Contention
Interactions among combatants often contribute to changes in both the levels and types of
political violence against civilians. An escalation in political violence by one actor is likely to
be reciprocated by opponents in an effort to raise the costs of such behaviors (Herman and
O'Sullivan 1989; Maney 2005; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009; Ukiwo 2009). In the process,
a tit-for-tat dynamic ensues, often culminating in an outward spiral of political violence.
Specific types of political violence against civilians are likely to be reciprocated, particularly
when they have the capacities and are not constrained by identity-based commitments. At a
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certain point, as civilian casualties rapidly mount, one or more of the actors may deliberately
reduce their violence against civilians in the hopes that others will follow suil. Because of this
tendency toward tactical convergence, we expect that major, sustained increases or decreases
in political violence against civilians by an armed actor are likely to be reciprocated by
opponents (H7).
Peace processes can constitute efforts to de-escalate armed conflict. Those participating
in peace processes mostly reduce their levels of political violence against both combatants and
civilians. However, there are occasions where participants engage in efforts to increase their
bargaining leverage at the negotiating table (Kriesberg 1995; Darby and MacGinty 2003-).
Moreover, for those armed actors not participating-either by involuntary exclusion or
voluntary refusal- peace processes are also likely to increase their categorical political
violence as they seek to undermine public support by heightening polarization, mistrust, and
uncertainty (Stedman 1997; Darby 2001 ; Newman and Richmond 2006). Accordingly, we
expect categorical political violence to increase during peace processes largely exclusive of
paramilitary organizations and to decrease during peace processes mostly inclusive of
paramilitary organizations (HS).

METHODOLOGY
Quantitative methodologies lend themselves to establishing variations in types of political
violence against civilians. Unfortunately, most studies have either examined political violence
without distinguishing between civilian and combatant status or have failed to differentiate
between different types of political violence. This absence can be largely attributed to two
factors. First, detailed infonnation on the circumstances and motives surrounding civilian
killings is often difficult to obtain. Second, such information tends to be deeply disputed
given its implications for the relative legitimacy of the actors involved in contention.
This article examines political violence against civilians in Northern Ireland between
1966 and 2006 (see Appendix B for a glossary of case-related terminology). Created through
an act of parliament, a peace treaty, and force of arms in the early I 920s, Northern Ireland is a
distinct political entity, comprising six of the thirty-two counties of the island of Ireland. It is
constitutionally linked with Great Britain as part of the United Kingdom. The other twenty-six
counties of Ireland are known as the Republic of Ireland, which was declared a sovereign,
independent republic in the constitution of 1937 and reaffirmed by an act of parliament in
1949. In 1966, the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising, Loyalists feared an upsurge in
Republican attacks and undertook a series ofraodom killings of Nationalists, led by the newly
formed paramilitary organization, the Ulster Volunteer Force. In 1965, mass civil rights
mobilization placed pressure upon the British state to force the Unionist-controlled Northern
Ireland state to redress the Nationalist population's grievances. Widespread rioting and the
subsequent introduction of British soldiers on the streets of Northern Ireland in August, 1969,
marked the beginning of a rapid escalation in political violence. The year 1972 brought the
highest level of politi cally related fatalities that Northern Ireland had ever experienced. Levels
of political violence declined markedly after 1976 with a number of subsequent spikes,
particularly during the hunger strikes of the early 19S0s and the beginning of the peace
process that led to the signing and ratification of the Belfast "Good Friday" Agreement in
1998. While the killing of civilians by Northern Ireland security forces largely ended in the
mid-1990s, both Loyalist and dissident Republican paramilitaries continue these practices.
We believe that the Northern Ireland is an ideal case for advancing our understanding of
political violence against civilians. It is arguable that the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland have
received more scholarly and media attention than any other ethnonationalist conflict. As a
result, detailed documentation exists 00 most civilian killings, allbwiog for their classification
into one of the four categories of political violence discussed above. The existence of multiple
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sources of data on civilian killings allows for both greater detail and greater confidence
regarding classification. For this anicle, we used the following data sources: Sullon 200 I;
Conflict Archive on the Internet nd; McKeown 2009; McKittrick 2004; findings by the
Independent Monitoring Commission 2004-2006; repons of the Police Service of Nonhern
Ireland Historical Enquiries Team 2005 to present; rulings by the European Court of Human
Rights; and the Saville Inquiry Report released in 2010. Moreover, in contrast to other cases
of anned conflict, month and year-level time-series data exists for several measures that can
help us to assess contextual factors influencing the prevalence of different forms of terrorism
against civilians. Findings on the basis of one case are preliminary and exploratory. However,
given the absence of this type of research, coupled with the influence of Northern Ireland
upon other ethoonationalist conflicts, the findings will provide an important first step toward
the rigorous analysis of political violence against civilians.
Disaggregaling Political Violence agains t Civilians

Each instance of a politically motivated killing of a civilian was classified into one of five
motivational categories: (I) selective political violence; (2) collateral political violence; (3)
categorical political violence; (4) indiscriminate political violence; or (5) uncertain. A death
was coded as selective political violence if the preponderance of evidence suggests that the
civilian was killed because of either her or his perceived or actual individual identity, role, or
behavior (for example, combatant; excombatant; political activist; common criminal). A death
was coded as collateral political violence if the preponderance of evidence suggests that the
person killed was not the intended target. A death was coded as categorical political violence
if the perpetrator had no apparent reason to kill the targeted civilian other than her or his
ethnonationalist affiliation. While some Protestants favor reunification and some Catholics
favor Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom, they consti tute very small minor-

ities. Accordingly, Protestants are used as a proxy measure for Unionists and Catholics for
Nationalists. A death was coded as indiscriminate political violence if the civilian killed was:
(I) of the same ethnonationalist affiliation; (2) not killed because of their individual identity,
role, or behavior; and (3) not the victim of collateral political violence. Seventy-seven deaths
were placed in an "uncertain" category and excluded from the analysis due to: (I) insufficient
information; (2) the absence of a majority or definitive opinion among the sources regarding
the perpetrator and motivation for the killing; or (3) multiple motivations for the killing, thus
preventing the exclusive assignment of the case to one of the four categories.
Killings were also classified in one of four general perpetrating actor categories: ( I)
Northern Ireland security forces; (2) Loyalist-affiliated individuals or organizations; (3) a
combination of Northern Ireland security forces and Loyalist-affiliated individuals or organizations; and (4) Republican-affiliated individuals or organizations. It is possible that some of

the cases have been erroneously classified. Intersource validation coupled with the large
number of cases, however, provides a high degree of confidence in the validity of the aggregated findings.
We used Cohen'S kappa as a measure to assess the rate of inter-coder agreement among
the three coders. A sample of 300 cases coded by two of the coders in all possible dyadic
combinations yielded a combined kappa score of 0.63. This score is generally considered to
indicate a substantial rate of agreement among the coders (see Landis and Koch 1977; Sirn
and Wright 2005). The data enable us to assess the relative engagement in different types of
political violence against civilians by different political actors over the course of the Troubles.
Conlextualizing Political Violence agaimt Civilians

We examine factors possibly influencing levels and types of political violence against
civilians. To do this, we ran time-series and logistic regressions of the number of killings
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within the category on selected independent variables (see Appendix C for a discussion of
regression diagnostics and remedies). All independent variables in time-series regressions
were lagged . Independent variables were selected on the basis of their operationalization of
concepts used in hypotheses along with the availability of continuous time-series data.
Strategy of Combatants

To assess whether shifts in paramilitary strategy affect levels and types of political
violence against civilians, we created dummy variables for three distinct strategic phases of
the armed Republican Struggle during the Troubles: an all out offensive strategy by the Provisionallrish Republican Army (IRA) after the split of the republican movement; the adoption
of the long war strategy after a ceasefire and negotiations with the British government in 1975
and 1976; and the TUAS Strategy articulated in an internal Republican document believed to
have been circulated in 1994 before being leaked in 1995 (see English 2002; Moloney 2002;
White 2006). TUAS is widely thuught tu stand fur either Tactical Use uf Armed Struggle or
Totally Unarmed Strategy. We expect categorical violence by Republicans to be highest
during the all out offensive and lowest during the TUAS phase.
Means of Contention

We hypothesized that the availability of different types of weaponry would affect levels
of political violence against civilians. Accordingly, in month-level time series regression analyses, we include measures of the number of shooting incidents, as well as the number of
explosive devices used. The data come from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, Report of the
Chief Constable, and the Police Service Northern Ireland's Statistic's branches website. Per
Robert White (J 993), month level figures are estimated by apportioning changes between the
year level data over a 12-month period.
Allies and Opponents

We created dummy variables for whether or not the location where a civilian was killed
was a loyalist paramilitary stronghold or a republican paramilitary stronghold. We compiled a
list of Republican strongholds from the geographically based brigade and battalion structure
of the Provisional IRA prior to its reorganization in 1977, and a list of the home residences of
current Republican prisoners supplied by the Sinn Fein POW Department. Given declining
participation upon the adoption of the Long War strategy, locations in the Republic of Ireland
coded as Republican strongholds prior to December 3, 1977 (the date of a change in the IRA's
Chief of Staff) were not coded as Republican strongholds after December 2, 1977. Similarly,
we compiled a list of Loyalist strongholds based upon the brigade areas of the Ulster Defence
Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force.
Collective Identities of Combatants
Drawing upon the same sources used to categorize types of political vio lence against
civilians, we created variables limiting political violence to one of the following perpetrators:
Loyalists, RepUblicans, or security forces. Because Republican identity is more inclusive of
Protestants than Loyalist identity is inclusive of Catholics, we expect Republicans to engage
in less categorical political violence than Loyalists.

Dynamics of Contention

To get at the possibility of the emergence of a tit-for-tat dynamic, the number of killings
by opposing political actors was included in certain time-series regression analyses. The dependent variable was also lagged to provide a measure of a sustained campaign. To assess
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whether or not opponents would reciprocate dc-escalation, we created a binary variable for
whether or not a cease fire by the Provisional IRA was in effecl. The Akaike Information Criterion was used to determine the appropriate lag for each model.
Above we argued that peace processes are likely to have different effects upon violence
against civilians depending upon whether or not paramilitary organizations are included in the
negotiations. Accordingly, we created two binary variables: one for peace processes that were
exclusive of Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organizations (such as the Sunningdale
negotiations and Agreement; the Constitutional Convention; the first Northern Ireland Assembly; and the Anglo-Irish Agreement), and the other for the negotiations, signing, and ratification through referenda of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement (BGFA). The BGFA process
was the first and only peace process during the Troubles to include representatives of Loyalist
and Republican paramilitary organizations.

Control Measures
Taking the lead from White (1993), unadjusted employment rates were included as a
measure of deprivation in month-level time series regression analyses. The data come from
three sources: the Digest of Statistics, the Annual Abstract of Statistics, and a report by the
Northern Ireland Statistical Researcb Agency. Discrepancies existed between figures for the
same yean; provided by different sources. Accordingly, figures were weighted using ratios to
standardize the data.
Again taking the lead from White (1993), as a general measure of repressive capacity we
used Annual Abstract of Statistics, Report of the Chief Constable, and the Police Service
Northern Ireland's Statistic's branches website to compile tbe number of security forces in
Northern Ireland in a given year. Given the findings by several quantitative studies of a
curvilinear relationship between repression and insurgency, we also include a squared tenn in
the regression model.

RESULTS
Table I disaggregates civilian deaths by four types of political violence against civilians by
the agent responsible. The findings support our first two hypotheses (again, see Appendix A
for a list of hypotheses). Of the four categories of political violence against civilians,
indiscriminate killings account for the lowest percentage of fatalities (3.0 perceOl). Even with
the Provisional IRA's largeting of businesses as part of its economic destabilization efforts in
the early 1970s, only 4.3 percent of civilians who lost their lives to Republican violence were
killed indiscriminately. Whether due to the desire not to alienate constituencies, a deep
identification with their co-nationals, or a combination of material and symbolic factors, indiscriminate political violence was not a prominent pan of the repertoire of anned contention
during the Troubles.
The Troubles were often portrayed as a sectarian conflict where civilians were mostly
killed for no reason other than their ethnonationalist amliation . If this were the case, then
categorical violence should account for the majority of civilian deaths. Table I, however,
reveals that selective and collateral political violence together accounted for 61 percent of
civilian deaths. Almost half lbe time (48 percent) civilians were killed because of their
perceived or actual behaviors. We coded 18 separate categories of behaviors that motivated
killings. Over half (56.7 percent) of such killings were the resull of either the perception or
the reality that the victim was active in a paramilitary organization. Civilians were also
frequently killed because they were believed to be or actually were involved in antisocial
behavior (6.8 percent of selective violence), informing (5.8 percent of selective violence),
political activism (5 .6 percent of selective violence), or providing services to an opponent (4.5
percent). Excombatanls were also often targeted (5 .6 percent of selective violence). With one
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Table I. Lethal Political Violence against Civilians by Perpetrator and Type

NI Security Forces
Loyalists

NISF and Loyalist
Republicans

Total

Select

Colhltenl

Cllteeo.-ical

Indisc.-iminllte

Total

N
(row %)

N
(row %)

N
(row %)

N
(row %)

(col. %)

268

44

45

0

357

(75.1%)

(12 .3%)

( 12.6%)

(0.0'10)

(14.1%)

306

61

556

27

950

(32.2%)

(6.4%)

(5 8.5%)

(2.8%)

(37.5%)

33

5

90

2

130

(25.4%)

(3.8%)

(69.2%)

(1.5%)

(5. 1%)

607

21 8

222

47

1.094

(55.5%)

( 19.9%)

(20.3%)

(4.3%)

(43.2%)

1.214

328

913

76

2,531

(36. 1%)

(3. 0'/.)

(100.0%)

(48.0%)
(13.0%)
NoleS : Includes the dealhs of civilian combatanls.

N

exception, these behaviors were directly related to contention. Individual civilians were fre-

quently targeted for their perceived or actual involvement in an lisocial bebaviors. In a context
wbere actors are armed to the teeth and paramililary organizations assume responsibilily for
nonn enforcement in areas that security forces are unwelcomed, civilians are more likely to

pay lhe ultimate price fo r disturbing the apolitical social order in their communities.
An additional 13 % of civilians killed between 1966 and 2006 died because they were in
the immediate proximity of armed contention. Of the 328 inslances of lethal collateral political violence identified, most civilians (82 %) were killed during operalions eitber targeling
combatants (66.2 %) or noncombatants (15 .8 %). The remainder were killed either because
guns or explosives accidentally went off during robberies or at security force checkpoints.
The results in table I provide important correclives to the most popular misconceptions
of polilical violence against civilians during the Troubles. The majority of civilian deaths
were closely tied to contention. Focusing primarily upon categorical political violence ignores

tbe prevalence of political violence based upon tbe perceived or aclual behaviors of civilians,
as well as their physical proximity to contention. This is nol 10 say, however, thai categorical
political violence did nol freque ntl y take place. On the contrary. over one-third (36.1 %) of
deaths involved civi lians who were targeted for no apparent reason other than their ethno-

nationalisl affilialion. Findings presented below demons Irate how conlenlion-related faclors
provide strong indicators of categorica l political violence agai nst civilians.

Table I reveals not only multiple lypes of political violence against civilians, but also
violent propensities according 10 political aclors. Republicans engaged in higher levels of both
seleclive and collateral polilical violence than either Loyalists or Northern Ireland Security
Forces. Moreover, Loyalists engaged in more categorical political violence than either Republicans or Northern Ireland Security Forces. Wben including killings involving collusion with
security forces, nearly lhree-fiftbs (59.2 percent) of killings by Loyalisis randomly targeted
Catholic civilians. In contrast, less than one quarter (20.3 percent) of Republican killings of
civilians randomly targeted Protes tants . These variations across political actors can be explained by contention-related factors, to which we now tum our attention.

Strategy and Lethal Political Violence against Civilians

We hypothesized that changes in the stralegies of combatants would produce changes in
the levels and forms of political violence against civilians not directly participating in armed
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Figure I. Republican Killings of Civilians by Type
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conflict (see H3). Figure I presents fonns of lethal political violence against noncombatant
civilians by Republicans over a 40·year period. The figure shows considerable variation in
both the levels and predominant fonns of Republican political violence against civilians over
the course of the Troubles. With the exception of indiscriminate political violence, which
appears only sporadically, there is an overall downward trend for each fonn of political
violence against civilians. This trend closely mirrors the Provisional IRA's strategic shifl from
an all out offensive (1970-1977) to a " long war" strategy of protracted, low·intensity conflict
(1978·1992), and fmally, to a move away from anned struggle (1992-present).
Cbanges in the type of political violence against civilians perpetrated by Republicans
were tightly coupled with shifts in the Provisional IRA' s strategy. In 1975, negotiations with
the British government failed to produce tangible progress towards reunification. A near yearlong ceasefire also contributed to the permanent demobilization of a large number of volun-

teers. At the same time, the British government managed to create several infonnants within
the ranks of the organization. Collectively, these developments prompted a change in strategy
in 1977. Abandoning conventional brigades, the IRA was reorganized into cell structures to
reduce the likelihood of infiltration. Rather than trying to score a decisive, inunediate victory
by making Northern Ireland ungovernable and destabilizing the economy, the goal was to win
through a long war of attrition. As a result, operations became more selective and focused
upon combatant targets. Lethal categorical political violence went from a high of forty civilians in 1976 to four civilians in 1977. Similarly, lethal collateral political violence decreased
from 24 civilians in 1976 to 4 civilians in 1977. At the same time, lethal selective political
violence against civilian noncombatanlS increased from 18 in 1976 to 21 civilians in 1977.
The year 1993 marked the start of an decline in both selective and categorical killings by
Republicans. The timing reflects the decision by the Anny Council to signal their willingness
to become involved in peace negotiations. During a speech on December 16, 1992, British
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, indicated the possibility of including
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Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) in future talks on the constitutional status of
Northern [reland. A little over a week later the [RA declared a three-day ceasefire, marking

the first in a series of ceasefires that eventually culminated in the complete decommissioning
of [RA weaponry by September of2005.
The spike in indiscriminate political violence in [998 is accounted for by one bombing by
Real IRA- an organization opposed to tbe Belfast Good Friday Peace Agreement. By all accounts, this effort to undermine the Agreement had the opposite effect, reminding former
combatants and the general public of the costs of an alternative to a negoti ated compromise.
Overall, the results underscore the importance of the strategies of combatants to understanding levels and forms of political violence against civilians. We now look at several factors

influencing the strategies of combatants, starting with the means of contention.
Means of Contention

Table 2 presents the findings from month-level time series regressions of different types
of lethal political violence against civilians on select independent variables. In addition to
independent variables included in most time-series analyses of political violence in Northern
Ireland (White 1993; Sullivan 1998; Maney 2007), we include measures for levels of usage of
both discriminate weaponry (firearms) and indiscriminate weaponry (explosive devices).

Table 2, Unstandardized Coefficients for Time Series Regressions of Lethal Violence against
Civilians on Selected Independent Variables: February 1966 to December 2006
Selective
Killi nl!s
Dependent Variable (lagged)

.036
(I. 72)

Repressive Capacity
(Repressive Capacityf x 10-6
Truce
Percent Unemployed
Discriminate Weaponry
Indiscriminate Weaponry
Constant

R'

-.000
(-0.73)
.000
(0.76)
-.059
(-0.31)
.058
(4.04)'"
-.000
(-1.07)
.001
(3.93)'''
.395
(0.19)
.26

Collateral
Killinl!:s

-.298
(-4.59)'"
-.001
(-2.90)"
.001
(2.66)"
1.155
(2.05)'
.101
(2.23),
-.000
(0.32)
.004
(3.89)'"
7.281
(2.94)"
.25

Categorical
KilliDl~s

.042
( 1.68)
-.000
(-3.37)"
.002
(3.74)'"
.463
(1.74)
.046
(1.73)
.000
(0.46)
.002
(5.04)'"
5.018
(2.22)'
.29

B-G LM SIal. (D-W SIaL)

1.13

(1.97)

0.0 1

Number of cases

455

455

455

Indiscriminate

Killi • ••
-.220
(-7.54)'"
-.000
(-0.51 )
.000
(0.34)
.690
( 1.23)
.035
(0.82).
.000
(0.80)
.001
(1.15)
.262
(OJO)

.07
(1.99)
455
P-WAR(I)
SSE Rob. SE

P-WAR(I)
Neg. Binomial
Neg. Binomia l
Robust SE
SSE Rob. SE
Robust SE
Noles: I p < .05 , II P < .01 iii P < .001 (one-tai led). Excludes deaths of combalant civilians. Independent variables are
lagged one month . The Breusch-Godfrcy test (8-G LM Stat.) is used to detect serial correlation in Ordinary Least
Squares regressions. The Durbin-Watson test (D·W Stat.) is used to detect serial correlation in P-W AR(I)
regressions. Negative binomial regressions arc used in cases where no serial correlation was detected. Instances of
serial correlation are remedied using the Prais·Winslen transformed regression estimator fP-W AR(I)]. Numbers in
parentheses are z·scores for negative binomial regressions and t-scores for Prais-Winsten regressions.
Estimation technique
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The analysis supports our expectation that the increased availability of less discriminating
weaponry increases political violence against civilians (see H4). The number of explosive
devices used had a strong, positive relationship to levels of selective killings, collateral
killings, and categorical killings' The findings underscore the way contention type impacts
levels of political violence against civilians.

Allies and Opponents
Are civilians located in areas characterized by high levels of direct participation and indirect support for paramilitary organizations more likely to be victims of categorical political
violence? The inclusion of location measures required switching from time series data to data
where individual civilian deaths constitute the unit of analysis. We ran logit models for lethal
categorical political violence by type of actor on select independent variables. Table 3 presents the findings.
The location of civilians in paramilitary strongholds was significantly related to lethal
categorical political violence by Republicans, Loyalists, and Security Forces. Consistent with
Hypothesis 5 and the idea that combatants attempt to raise the costs to civilians complicit with
opponents, Loyalists and Security Forces frequently targeted civilians in areas characterized
by high levels of participation in and support for Republican paramilitary organizations. The
flipside of punishing civilians complicit with opponents is protecting civilians in allied areas.
Northern lreland security forces were significantly less likely to kill civilians in Loyalist
paramilitary strongholds.
Table 3. Unstandardized Coefficients for Logistic Regressions of Lethal Categorical Political
Violence against Civilians by Specific Perpetrators on Selected lndependent Variables
LCPVC
bI Re2ublicans
.555
(2.59)"

PIRA All Out Offensive

LCPVC
bI LOIaU.t.
.456
(4.04)""

LCPVC
bl: Securitl: Forces
1.995
(6.25)",'

Truce

.712
(4.09)'"

· .081
(·0.60)

.235
(0.99)

Exclusive Peace Processes

.059
(0.30)

.424
(3.82),"

.295
(1.4 1)

•

Belfast GF Agreement

.183
(1.01)

Loyalist Stronghold

1.359
(3 .50),"

•

.580
(4.63)'"

· 1.044
(.2.84)"'

Republican Stronghold

· .913
(-4.51 )""

.241
(2.21)'

1.001
(4.97)'"

Constant

·2.533
(.14.83)""

·1.339
(-13.55)""

-4.605
(.14.71)""

Pseudo Rl
Number of cases
Estimation technique
Noles: ' p < .OS,

Ii

P < ,01

hi

.05

.04

. 15

1,861

1,89 1

1,861

Logi! Robust SE

Logi! Robus! SE

Logi! Robust SE

P < .001 (one-tailed). Excludes deaths of combatanl civilians and deaths taking place

oUlSide of the island of lreland. Numbers in parentheses arc Z-SCOre5.
" Variable was excluded because it predicts failure perfectly. Deaths taking placc during negotiation and ratification

of the agreement were dropped from the analysis.
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Catholic civilians' presence in Loyalist paramilitary strongholds also increased their likelihood of being killed. The finding may reflect attempts by Loyalist paramilitaries to reduce
negative sanctioning for lethal categorical violence. Killing complicit civilians in one's own

area decreased the likelihood of encountering armed Republican patrols protecting their
strongholds as well as the likelihood of civilians coming forward as witnesses. The killings
might also have been part of efforts to secure territorial control by forcibly excluding Catholics from Loyalist neighborhoods.'
Inconsistent with our hypothesis, lethal categorical political violence by Republicans was
not significantly related to a civilian's location in a Loyalist paramilitary stronghold. Moreover, unlike Loyalists, Republicans were significantly less likely to kill Protestant civilians
located in Republican strongholds. We attribute these anomalous findings to collective identity differences among the combatants.
Collective Identities of Combatants

We expected combatants drawing inclusive identity boundaries to be less likely to engage
in categorical political violence against complicit civilians than combatants drawing exclusive

identity boundaries (see H6). Consistent with this expectation, categorical political violence
constituted 20.3 percent of lethal violence against civilians by Republicans compared to 59.2
percent of lethal violence against civilians by Loyalists' Loyalists generally view the mainly
Catholic Nationalist popUlation as complicit in Republican paramilitary operations and unlikely
to ever be convinced to support Northern Ireland being part of the United Kingdom. In
contrast, to engage in higher levels of categorical violence would severely undermine the
credibility of claims by Republicans that they are engaged in a nonsectarian, anticolonial liberation struggle. The results suggest that collective identities play critical roles in political violence against civilians.

Dynamics of Contention

To ascertain whether or not combatants influenced one another's behaviors, we ran time
series regressions that include lagged measures of lethal political violence against civilians
committed by other actors. We used the Akaike Information Criterion to select the appropriate
time lag for each model . Table 4 presents the results.
The findings are mostly consistent with our expectation that combatants reciprocate

major escalating and de-escalating actions by opponents (see H7). Lethal violence against
noncombatant civilians by Republicans was positively related to lethal violence against noncombatant civilians by Loyalists (and vice versa). Loyalists and Security Forces escalated
political violence against noncombatant civilians during, and likely in response to, the PIRA 's
all out offensive strategy of the early to mid-1970s. Conversely, Loyalists responded to PlRA
cease fires by significantly decreasing their killings of noncombatant civilians. The results
suggest to us that both Loyalists and Republicans used noncombatant civilian killings as ways
to raise the costs offurther civilian killings by their opponents. A series oftit-for-tat responses
often resulted in an outward spiral of political violence against civilians.
It is important to note, however, that security forces did not immediately and significantly
alter their levels of political violence against noncombatant civilians in response to civilian

killings by either RepUblicans or Loyalists. In a month-level regression of all political deaths
in Northern Ireland, Maney (2007: 83) found that increases in killings by Republicans were
positively related to subsequent killings by Security Forces. The combination of these results
and the findings in table 4 raises the possibility that political violence against civilians by
Security Forces was more likely to be affected by Republican killings of security personnel
than Republican killings of civilians. Such a relationship would not be surprising given the
presence of large numbers of British soldiers who were not from either Loyalist or Republican
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Table 4. Unstandardized Coefficients for Time-Series Regressions of Lethal Political
Violence against Civilians by Specific Perpetrator: January 2, 1966 to December 31 , 2006
LPVC
by Republicans
PlRA All Out Offensive

1.1 53
(9. 17)'"

LPVC
by Loyalists
I .522

LPVC
by 8«urity Forces

(14.89),,'

.031
(3.63)'"

Truce

-.47 1
(-1.84)

-.331
(-3 .05)"

-.011
(-5.00)'"

Exclusive Peace Processes

.433
(3 .11)"

.330
(3.09)"

(-2.30)'

Belfast Good Friday Agreement

-1.323
(-3.02)"

. 157
(0.70)

-.005
(-2.50)'

LPVNC by Republicans

-.058
(-0.67)'

.209
(2.59)'

-.001
(-0.4 1)

LPVNC by Loyalists

.25 1
(2 .95)"

.792
(4.80),"

(0.23)

.260
(1.1 0)

.177
(0.35)

( 1.34)

LPVNC by Security Forces

.003

.109

Constant

-3.261
(-32.85)'"

Pseudo II'

.04

.08

.02

B-G LM Stat. (D-W Stat.)

0.44

0.28

(183)

1 week

I day

2 days

14,968

14,974

14,973

Neg. Binomial
Robust SE

Neg. Binomial
Robust SE

P-WAR(1)
Robust SE

Number of lags on IV ARs
Number of cases
Estlmation technique

Q

-3 .482
(-48.73)'"

-.011

-7. 196
(-2 1.85)'"

NOles: • p < .05,

it P < .01 ... p < .001 (one-tailed). Excludes deaths of combatant civilians. The Breusch-Godfrcy test
(B-G LM Stat.) is used to detcct serial correlation in Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The Durbin-Watson lest (OW Stat.) is used to detect serial correlation in poW AR(I) regressions. Numbers in parentheses arc z-seores. Cases of
collusion between Loyalists and Security Forces arc excluded to avoid multicollinearity problems.
" Independent variables are lagged. Number of lags determined using tbe Akaike Information Criterion .

areas. A lack of identification with either ethnonationalist group could explain a lack of a
concerted response. Unfortunately, our data does not include a measure for deaths of Security
Force members. Further research is needed on this subject.
Peace processes had important effects upon levels of lethal political violence against
civilians. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, killings of noncombatant civilians by both Loyalists
and Republicans increased significantly during peace processes that excluded them. Conversely, Republican violence against civilians decreased significantly during the one peace
process that included them- the process culminating in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement
(BGFA). Reflecting the lower degree of Unionist support for the negotiations and their
outcome, there was no significant relationship between civilian killings by Loyalists and the
BGFA. Nonetheless, the finding that Loyalist killings of civilians was not positive ly related to
a peace process that included them is a noteworthy departure from responses to past peace
processes that excluded them. Reflective of the British government's efforts to maximi ze
public support for peace processes, civilian killings by sec urity forces significantly decreased
regardless of whether or not peace processes were inclusive of paramilitary groups. Overall,
the findings suggest that negotiation is more effective than repression in reducing political
violence against civilians by paramilitary organizations.
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CONCLUSIONS

Unfortunately, recent academic studies are characterized by a lack of consensus on how to
define terrorism. Ironically, they also give prevalence to monocausal explanations that are
strangely reminiscent of early, now-discarded social movement theories. Drawing on con-

temporary theories and methods from social movement research and from peace and conflict
studies, we have suggested a contention-oriented approacb that broadens our understanding of
political violence against civilians. Both fields sensitize us to the relevance of discourse to
power and resistance. Accordingly, we jettison the concept of terror in favor of the concept of

political violence of civilians. This alternative terminology not only facilitates a greater
degree of analytic neutrality, it also assists in the recognition of multiple types of perpetrators
and different motivations for why civilians are killed.
We propose four types of political violence against civilians- selective, collateral, categorical. and indiscriminate. Our quantitative analysis of civilian deaths over the course of

forty years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland indicates large numbers of killings in three of
the four categories by both state and nonstate actors. Illustrating the folly of monocausal,
static explanations, these analyses provide strong empirical support for: (1) a wide range of
reasons why civilians are killed; (2) variations in the types of political violence against civilians committed by different combatants; and (3) cbanges over time in the forms of political
violence against civilians that dominate contention.

The findings demonstrate the insights provided by a contention-oriented approach. In
contrast to popular portrayals of ethnonationalist violence against civilians as primarily, if not
exclusively, sectarian, the majority of civilians killed during the Troubles were either targeted
because of their behaviors (perceived or actual) or were killed because of their pbysical
proximity to contention or combatants. Several different behaviors resulted in civilians being
frequently killed-above all, the perception or the reality that the civilian was directly involved

in armed struggle.
Like other types of social movements, armed ethnonationalist movements developed and
implemented strategies over the course of contention. These strategies can critically affect
levels and forms of violence against civilians. For instance, an end to an all-out offensive by
the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the mid-1970s resulted in significant reductions in
all forms of political violence against civilians, particularly collateral and categorical forms.
As social movement scholars increasingly revisit the subject of strategy, we should apply new
insights to understanding political violence.
By affecting the formation and implementation of the strategies of combatants, several
other factors influenced the killings of civilians. Surprisingly little scholarly allention has been
devoted to the relationship between weapons technologies and forms of terrorism against
civilians. The use of indiscriminate weapons was significantly related to multiple fonns of
political violence against civilians. The rmdings have important practical implications for
security strategies. In particular, when civilians' lives are given higher priority than the lives
of security forces (which our analysis above suggests may not always be the case), then
security forces are better advised to concentrate their investigative efforts on finding ex-

plosives rather than upon finding firearms. While televised displays of seizures of large arms
caches plays well with the media and the general public, they put uninvolved civilians more in
harm's way if they divert resources away from seizing explosives. The feeling of greater
security among the populace generated by these images actually is diametrically opposed to
the reality of greater insecurity.
Our analysis adds nuance to the assertion that complicit civilians are more likely to be
victims of categorical political violence. As expected, Catholic civilians located in Republican
paramilitary strongholds were more likely to be randomly killed by Loyalists and Security
Forces than civilians elsewhere. Protestant civilians located in Loyalist paramilitary slrong-

holds, however, were not significantly more likely to be randomly killed by Republicans.
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Moreover, Protestant civilians were less likely to be killed in Republican strongholds. The
results underscore the importance of collective identity to explaining political violence against
civilians. Whereas neither Loyalists nor Republicans could reasonably expect to form alliances with civilians having opposing ethnonationalist affiliations, Loyalists engaged in categorical violence to a far greater extent than RepUblicans. The findings are consistent with the
more inclusive identity boundaries drawn by Republicans. They also underscore the need for
social movement scholars studying the dynamics of contention to pay closer auention to
symbolic factors. For peace scholars, the results affirm the importance of identity transformation to the reduction of intergroup violence.
This is not to say that combatants do not influence one another's behaviors. Loyalists and
Republicans frequently reciprocated each other's increases and decreases in civilian killings.
Both Loyalists and Security Forces negatively sanctioned the Provisional IRA's all-out offensive by significantly increasing categorical violence. The results underscore a recurrent
theme in peace and conflict studies, namely how defensive effons to deter attacks on civilians

by opponents can result in a rapid increase in political violence. Conversely, both sets of actors
positively sanctioned PIRA ceasefires by decreasing categorical violence. So while combatants can inadvertently reinforce political violence against civilians through their effons at
deterrence, they also have the agency to break the cycle by ending reciprocal violence.
Our findings suggest that the hegemonic political discourse of not negotiating with
terrorists can, if implemented as policy, contribute to sustained paramilitary violence against
civilians. The ftrst four major initiatives at a negotiated political seulement in Northern
Ireland were exclusive of political parties associated with paramilitary organizations. Both
Republicans and Loyalists significantly intensified their auacks on civilians during these
peace processes. In contrast, Republicans, on the whole, decreased their attacks on civilians
during the peace process that resulted in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement- a process that
was inclusive of Sinn Fein, the political party supportive of the Irish Republican Army.
Moreover, categorical violence by Loyalists did not significantly increase as it had in past
pcace processes. The results lend compelling quantitative support to an important finding
from comparative historical research: peace processes are less likely to succeed if they exclude those who are capable of spoiling the process by auacking civilians.
Similar types of analyses are needed to determine the external validity of the findings for
this case. Continuous, longitudinal measures related to other potential sources of political
violence against civilians such as high levels of nonviolent protests, inflammatory media
coverage, polarized cross~ommunity attitudes, industrial unrest, high levels of residential
segregation, and low levels of exogamy were not available in this case, but could be accessible to scholars studying other cases. In panicular, we call for closer aUention to the
relationship between nonviolent protests and armed rebellion and how this relationship
influences levels and fonns o f political violence against civilians. Such studies of contention

are badly needed if we are to go beyond impressionistic and polemical studies to gain a
nuanced understanding of phenomena that have such negative social consequences.

APPENDIX A:
LIST OF HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: Indiscriminate political violence against civilians will take place the leas\.
Hypothesis 2: Over the course of a cycle of contention, selective and collateral political
violence will constitute large percentages of civilian victims.
Hypothesis 3: Major changes in the strategies of combatants are likely to lead to significant
changes in the levels and types or political violence perpetrated against civilians.
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Hypothesis 4: The increased availability of less discriminating weaponry increases all forms
of political violence against civilians.
Hypothesis 5: Civilians in areas providing high levels of support for an armed actor are more
likely to be victims of categorical political violence.
Hypothesis 6: Combatants with more inclusive collective identities will be less likely to
engage In categorical political violence than combatants with more exclusi ve collective
identities.
Hypothesis 7: Major, sustained increases or decreases in polilical violence against civilians
by an armed actor are likely to be reciprocated by opponents.
Hypothesis 8: Categorical political violence increases during peace processes largely
exclusive of paramilitary organizations and decreases during peace processes mostly inclusive
of paramilitary organizations.

APPENDIX B:
GLOSSARY OF CASE-SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY'
Term
Loyalists

Definition
Militant Unionists

Nationalists

Mostly Catholic; favor the reunification of Ireland

Northern Ireland

Six of the thirty.two counties of the island of Ireland that are linked politically
with Great Britain as pan of the United Kingdom. The other twenty·six counties
arc known as the Republic of Ireland. which was declared a so\'ereign,
independent, democratic state in the 1937 constitution and declared a Republic
by act of parliament in 1949.

Panition

Political separation of Nonhern Ireland from the rest of Ireland; established
under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish (Irish Free
State) Treaty of 1921.

Republicans

Militant Nationalists

Reunification

Ending the panition of Ireland and return ing to the rule of Ireland as one political
unit as had becn the case prior to the early 1920s.

Unionists

Mostly Protestant; favor retaining the existing status of Northern Ireland as part
of the United Kingdom.

APPENDIX C:
DISCUSSION OF REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS AND REMEDIES'
Where possible, the Breusch-Godfrey test was used to detect serial correlation. Unlike the
Durbin Watson statistic, the test detects higher order correlations and can be used on
regression models that include lagged endogenous variables (Greene 2000: 540; Ostrom 1990:
65). Instances of serial correlation were remedied by performing the Hildreth and Lu procedure for searching for a value of p that minimizes the error sum of squares for transformed
equations. The procedure beuer approximates the maximum likelihood estimator of p
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998: 164). Without Hildreth-Lu, various transformation procedures
experienced difficulties in converging in cases when the value of p was large. We opted for
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the Prais-Winsten transfonnation because the Corchrane-Orcutt method negatively affects

estimator efficiency by discarding the initial observation in the data set (Greene 2000: S47).
The Cook-Weisbe rg test was used to check for heteroscedasticity. We used a Huber-White

sandwich estimator in cases of unequal error variances. Our decision to use this estimator
reflects the trend away from weighted least squares and other complex corrective procedures
(Greene 2000: 522).

NOTES
I While the concept of "state terrorism" helps somewhat to correct the imbalance, the disproportionate access of
political elites 10 mass communications means that nonstate actors will likely come to mind firs t when the term
"terrorism" is read or heard.
2 As wilh the concept of "Ierror," the term "collateral damage" forms part of a discourse thaI legitimates political
\'iolence by Slale actors. We cboose to usc the term collateral violence instead to highlight the physical harm to
humans. The lerm collateral is retained as it emphasizes the discrepancy between intent and outcome. We
disassociate ourselves from the idea that a lack of intent to inflict barm upon civilians exonerates perpetrators from
legal and ethical responsibilities to protect civilians.
1 Jeff Goodwin (2006) uses the tcnru categorical terrorism and indiscriminate terrorism interchangeably. In this
article, we make a distinction between these tenns to emphasize that categorical violence is to a certain degree
discriminating in that a civilian is targeted based upon their perceived affiliation with a collectivity.
' The exception was indiscriminate violence where only the lagged dependent variable was significantly related. The
model 's lack of predictive power is not surprising given the infrequent and sporadic occurrence of indiscriminate
killings (see table 1 and figure I).
S We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.
6 The percentage for Loyalists includes kil.lings involving collusion with security forces.
7 Much of this appendix appeared in Maney (2007) .
• Much of trus appendix appeared in Maney (2001).
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